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ARGUMfc.NT 
I. Defendants exalt form over substance, contrary 
to the purpose of summary judgment. There remai n 
substantial factual issues regarding the time 
at which the causes of action, both in tort and 
contract, accrued. Defendants have never shown 
their entitlement to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. , . . . < • • 
IT... On remand, the Larsons should be ei i tit led to tl: le 
"discovery11 rule on the statute of limitations 
issue. In any event, reversa1 i s required even 
under the general n iJ e • 
III. The supplementary materials should be 
considered ••,..,,,....•.,.,....«.••....•» 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, an indi-
vidual, and LARSON FORD 
SALES, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
STEPHEN WADE, individually, 
and STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, 
KIPP WADE, dba SBK, a general 
partnership, and VALLEY FORD, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 900535-CA 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
None of the cases cited by defendants-respondents 
(hereinafter "Wades" or "defendants") support defendants 
estoppel-by-pleading argument in the context of a motion to 
dismiss. Pleadings are to be liberally construed, particularly 
in early proceedings such as this, where the defendants have not 
even answered, and particularly with respect to the tort claims 
of plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter "Larsons") as to which no 
inconsistency can even be claimed. There remains no evidence 
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that the Stephen Wade, Inc. Plan of Reorganization breached the 
oral contract on any date certain because neither the Plan nor 
any of the post confirmation orders were ever placed in the 
record. 
The Notice of Order of Confirmation, which is in the Record, 
vests the property of the estate in Valley Ford, Inc., "except as 
otherwise provided in the Plan,11 which Plan is not disclosed. 
Under bankruptcy law, a "confirmed11 plan is binding only if its 
terms so provide, and then only to the extent provided. Since 
the terms are not provided here, summary judgment cannot be 
sustained. Submission of the Plan, at most, repudiated the oral 
contract, although even this conclusion cannot be reached without 
consideration of the terms of the Plan itself. 
Even under the general "accrual" standard, the Larsons1 
complaint is timely. Because the Plan was not placed into the 
Record, the only date on which the breach of contract claims can 
be found to have accrued is June 24, 1983, within four years 
prior to filing. The assets were "intact" as of that date. The 
Larsons1 tort claims therefore accrued after that time. Upon 
remand, the Larsons should benefit from the discovery rule 
because the assets were "intact" when the Larsons were ordered 
from the premises and the Larsons did not discover the torts 
until more than one year later. 
The Larsons intend to urge consideration by the panel of the 
materials included in the Larsons1 motion to supplement the 
record. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS EXALT FORM OVER SUBSTANCE, CONTRARY TO THE 
PURPOSE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THERE REMAIN SUBSTANTIAL 
FACTUAL ISSUES REGARDING THE TIME AT WHICH THE CAUSES OF 
ACTION, BOTH IN TORT AND CONTRACT, ACCRUED. DEFENDANTS 
HAVE NEVER SHOWN THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Neither the words in the second cause of action (inter-
ference with business relations) that Stephen Wade, "having 
breached his agreement with the plaintiff, conspired with and 
induced...,11 nor the words in the third cause of action (breach 
of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and conversion) that 
defendants "did submit a contrary and adversary Plan to the 
Plaintifffs plan ... which plan violated the contractual agree-
ment between Plaintiff and Defendants" proves, as a matter of 
law, that defendants breached their contract with plaintiffs (as 
alleged in the first cause of action), more than four years prior 
to the filing of plaintiffs1 complaint. This language has 
nothing whatsoever do to with the timeliness of plaintiffs1 tort 
claims, as will be demonstrated below. Neither should it bar 
plaintiffs1 breach of contract claims, particularly where 
defendants elected not to disclose to the court either the terms 
of the Plan of Reorganization below or the post confirmation 
orders dealing with the effective date of the Plan. 
The Wades cite three cases to support the conclusion that 
this language should bar plaintiffs1 breach of contract claims, 
however, none of them even considers this estoppel-by-pleading 
argument as early in the course of litigation as the pre-answer 
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motion to dismiss in the present case. All three cases cited by 
defendants were fully tried. In Dailey v. Barnhardt, 768 P. 2d 
907 (Okl. App., 1988), the case was fully tried, including a 
pretrial order into which the pleadings were deemed merged. In 
Kula v. Karat, Inc., 91 Nev. 100, 531 P. 2d 1353 (1975), the case 
was fully tried. In Taylor v Pearl, 249 Or. 611, 439 P. 2d 7 
(1968), the case appears to have been fully tried. 
It is ironic that these defendants claim an estoppel from 
the Larsons1 unverified complaint, when they have not even 
answered its allegations. The Wades should have been required to 
answer before moving to dismiss on the basis of any statute of 
limitations, as the Larsons initially argued. Brief of 
Appellants, p. 15. 
To sustain the dismissal of plaintiffs1 breach of contract 
claims, this Court must be prepared to rule, as a matter of law 
and solely on the basis of the Larsons1 unverified complaint, 
that at no point in these proceedings would the Larsons be 
entitled to prove that "breach" of the oral contract occurred 
only when the Plan became effective. To so hold would be wholly 
inconsistent with the liberal pleading policy in effect in this 
jurisdiction. Consider Gill v^ Timm, 720 P. 2d 1352 (Utah, 
1986): 
"Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed when 
determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint.... 
if 
.... 
"If there is any question about the sufficiency 
of the complaint, it was removed when the trial 
court, acting under Rule 15(b), allowed amendment 
of the pleadings to conform to the evidence adduced 
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at trial. This procedure is much preferred to 
the alternative of dismiss!! ,f 720 P. 2d at 1353. 
Even at trial, to maintain an estoppel-by-pleading objection 
to the introduction of evidence, the objecting party must 
convince the court "that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits." Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Here there 
can be no prejudice to the Wades whatsoever since the same 
attorneys which defend them here also prepared the Plan. The 
simple fact is that they elected not to place the Plan into the 
record, relying instead on the mystical concepts of "submission" 
and "confirmation" to convince the lower court that the door 
between the Wades and the Larsons had closed more than four years 
before filing. As will be shown below, the submission of the 
plan was, at most, a repudiation of the oral contract which did 
not start the running of the statute of limitations. 
The defendants should not be permitted to so exalt form 
over substance, or put another way, to so reduce this case to a 
question of legal gamesmanship, particularly not this early in 
the litigation, before any answer has even been filed. 
In effect, the Wades have used summary judgment contrary to 
its true intention, that being, to pierce the pleadings and 
determine genuine triable issues. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver 
Mining, 740 P. 2d 1304 (Utah, 1987). 
This conclusion applies a fortiori to the allegations of the 
Larsons1 complaint sounding in tort. "Breached," and "violated" 
as they appear in the complaint, do not even speak to the 
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question of when the torts occurred, and there is nothing in the 
record to even suggest when that may have been because the Wades 
elected not to place either the Plan or the post confirmation 
orders into the record. 
All three of the torts alleged in the third cause of 
action—breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and 
conversion—involve wrongful transfers of Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. property: (1) an $1,800,000.00 lease; (2) a $200,000.00 
parts inventory; and (3) $90,000.00 of furniture and equipment. 
The Notice of Order of Confirmation, which is part of the Record 
here (R. 34-36), provides: 
n2. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan or 
the Confirmation Order, the confirmation of the Plan vests 
all of the property of the estate in Valley Ford, Inc.11 
[Emphasis supplied.] (R. 35). 
On the basis of the Notice itself, it is impossible to 
conclude, as a matter of law, the date on which any assets 
"vested11 in Valley Ford, Inc. since the Notice itself expressly 
refers the recipient of the Notice to the Plan for additional 
information on that question. In addition, the affidavit of 
Walter Park Larson creates clear factual issues precluding 
summary judgment on the tort claims. It declares that the parts 
"were intact on June 24, 1983," a date within four years prior to 
filing of the Larsons1 complaint, and had "disappeared" only 18 
months later. 1/ 
1/The Wades below relied exclusively on Utahfs four year statute 
of limitations, Section 78-12-25, Utah Code. Here they 
obliquely reference Utah's three year statute, Section 78-12-
26, Utah Code as well. This latter statute should not be 
considered. 
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The defendants argue that "confirmation11 of the Plan is a 
breach of the oral contract as a matter of law because under 11 
U. S. C. Section 1129(c) the bankrupcty court f,may confirm only 
one plan." In reply, the Larsons cite 11 U. S. C. Section 1141, 
captioned "Effect of Confirmation.11 11 U. S. C. Section 1141(a) 
specifically provides that "the provisions of a confirmed plan 
bind the debtor . . . [and] any entity acquiring property under 
the plan. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, is it clear that 
"confirmation11 is not an event of unvarying and universal import; 
it is instead an event whose legal significance is dictated by 
the terms of the plan itself. 2/ Since the terms of this Plan 
were not presented below, the legal significance of "confirma-
2/That the legal effect of "confirmation" varies according to the 
terms of the plan is buttressed by other provisions of 11 U. S. 
C. Section 1141: 
"(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan 
or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation 
of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in 
the debtor. 
"(c) Except j ^ ^ ajs otherwise provided in the plan or 
in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a 
plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear 
of all claims and interests of creditors...." 
"(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in ^ ^ the plan, 
or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a 
plan — 
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose 
before the date of such confirmation.... 
it 
.... 
(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity 
security holders and general partners provided for by 
the plan." [Emphasis supplied.] 
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tionlf cannot be decided here, particularly not as a matter of 
law. 
Under 11 U. S. C. Section 1141, it is clear that neither the 
debtor nor the plan proponent are bound until "confirmation,11 and 
then only if and to the extent that the plan so provides. If the 
plan so provides, there is, in effect, no binding plan until 
contingent future events occur. A plan with contingencies 
therefore gives the plan proponent great flexibility, for if the 
contingencies are not realized, the plan proponent is not bound. 
Since the record below does not show the terms of the plan, the 
proposition that the plan did anything as a matter of law, either 
in contract or in tort, simply cannot be sustained. 
It is not insignificant that the Notice of Order of 
Confirmation of Plan (R. 34-36) parrots the language of 11 U. S. 
C. Section 1141(a) with one telling exception. 11 U. S. C. 
Section 1141(a) provides that "the provisions of a confirmed plan 
bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the plan, 
any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor, 
equity security holder" of the debtor [Emphasis supplied]. The 
Notice of Order of Confirmation of this specific Plan parrots 
this language, except for the deletion of "any entity acquiring 
property under the plan." It reads instead, "the provisions of 
the Plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the 
Plan and any creditor, or equity security holder of the 
debtor.••• 
The language in the Notice of Confirmation which describes 
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the rights of any entity acquiring property under the Plan has 
been referred to above and is expressly contingent upon the 
undisclosed terms of the Plan itself: 
"2. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan 
or the Confirmation Order, the confirmation of the Plan 
vests all of the property of the estate in Valley Ford, 
Inc. (R. 35). See Addendum 3, Exhibit A, p. 2, Brief of 
Appellant. 
The Larsons respectfully submit that the Court should read 
this modification of 11 U. S. C. Section 1129(c) as set forth in 
the Notice, as an admission by defendants that the Plan does 
indeed "otherwise provide11 on the question of vesting of the 
property of the Estate. It is therefore impossible to say as a 
matter of law this Plan either breaches the oral contract or 
causes any transfer of assets sufficient to effect a tort on any 
date certain. 3/ 
Since the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, 
that "confirmation11 of the Plan was a breach of the oral 
contract, it certainly cannot find, as a matter of law, that 
3/0ther provisions of the Notice also noting exceptions to 
confirmation based on the terms of the Plan are: 
"3. The property dealt with by the Plan is free 
and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests 
of creditors and of equity holders in the debtor, except 
as otherwise provided in the Plan or in the Confirm-
ation Order. 
"4. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan, 
or in the Confirmation Order, the confirmation discharges 
the debtor, the proponent of the Plan, SBK, and Valley 
Ford, Inc. from any debt that arose before the 
Confirmation Order was entered . . . ." (R 35). See 
Addendum 3, Exhibit A, p 2, Brief of Appellants. 
9 
"submission" of the Plan was a breach of the oral contract. The 
plan proponent, Stephen Wade, Inc., is not even a party to this 
litigation, and as already shown, no plan has any binding effect 
until confirmed and then only if and to the extent that the terms 
of the plan so provide, which terms are not disclosed. 
While it is true that there can be only one confirmed plan, 
11 U. S. C. Section 1129(c), there is no prohibition against the 
submission of multiple, alternative plans. There is, therefore 
no basis for the conclusion that submission of this plan 
"breached" the oral contract. 
"Breach" is a "failure to perform...." Contracts, Section 
445, 17 Am Jur 2d 903. "Repudiation," on the other hand, is a 
"renunciation" of performance "before the time for performance, 
which amounts to a refusal to perform...." Contracts, Section 
449, 17 Am Jur 2d 912. Since there is no law against the 
submission of alternative, multiple plans, it is impossible to 
conclude, as a matter of law, that submission of this Plan did 
anything more than repudiate the oral contract. It is, in fact, 
impossible to conclude, as a matter of law, that this Plan even 
repudiated the oral contract without consideration of its terms. 
The law of limitations as applied to repudiation is clear: 
"[Wjhere an action is brought after the time fixed by an 
executory contract for the beginning of performance by a party 
who has committed an anticipatory breach, the period of 
limitations runs, not from the time of such breach, but from the 
time fixed by the contract for performance by the defaulting 
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party, Limiation of Actions, Section 132, 51 Am Jur 2d 701. 
Since there is no evidence of (1) the time for performance; (2) 
what a reasonable time for performance would be; or (3) whether 
this plan even repudiated performance or was instead so 
contingent that it could be deemed neither a breach nor a 
repudiation, the questions of breach or repudiation at this or 
that time, require further factual development through the course 
of the litigation. 
The judgment below should be reversed. 
II. ON REMAND, THE LARSONS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE "DISCOVERY" 
RULE ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT, 
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED EVEN UNDER THE GENERAL RULE. 
Even under the standard relied upon by defendants, that 
being, that a cause of action does not accrue until ,,fthe 
happening of the last event necessary to ... the cause of 
action.' Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P. 2d 1254, 1257 
(Utah, 1983)." Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const., 744 P. 2d 
1370 (Utah, 1987), summary judgment should not have been granted. 
Since there is no proof of either the terms of the Plan or its 
effective date, there is no proof of when the last event 
necessary to any cause of action may have occurred. Walter Park 
Larson's statement that he did not know the Wades were not going 
to honor their verbal contract until June 24, 1983 is 
entirely consistent with a plan still contingent as of that date. 
With respect to the tort claims, the affidavit of Walter Park 
Larson shows that the torts alleged were continuing well after 
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eviction on June 24, 1983, culminating with a parts sale 18 
months later. All of this precludes summary judgment. 
Even though summary judgment should not have been granted 
under the above standard, the Larsons submit that the discovery 
rule should be held to apply here, particularly with respect to 
the tort claims. With respect to the breach of contract, Walter 
Park Larson states that he did not know the Wades would not 
perform on the contract until June 24, 1983 when ordered evicted. 
This discovery would be consistent with a Plan still contingent 
as of that date. It is also entirely consistent with the Notice 
of Order of Confirmation which in fact refers each recipient of 
the Notice to the Plan itself on many specific questions relating 
to the overall effectiveness of the Plan. With respect to the 
tort claims, Walter Park Larson states that he was ordered out on 
June 24, 1983, that on that date the parts inventory was intact 
and that he "only learned eighteen (18) months later when an 
official sale took place that all but $5,000.00 (appraised) had 
disappeared.ff Giving this affidavit the reasonable inferences to 
which it is entitled, Spor v. Crested Butte, supra, the 
conversion of the parts did not start until after eviction from 
the dealership on June 24, 1983 and was not completed and 
discovered until eighteen (18) months later. Since the Larsons 
were remobed from any contact or control over the parts, this 
case is indeed one in which the discovery rule should be held to 
apply, cf. Vincent v^ Salt Lake County, 583 P. 2d 105 (Utah, 
1978); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah, 1981). 
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III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. 
The Larsons1 motion to supplement the record has been 
denied, but without prejudice to renewal of that motion before the 
panel which hears this appeal. The Larsons intend to renew 
their motion to supplement before that panel, but, in fairness to 
defendants, without further argument here. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for discovery and trial. 
DATED this i^^day of March, 1991. 
L. Edward Robbins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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